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 Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
Making and Breaking Promises 
The European Union under the Treaty of Lisbon 
1. Introduction 
The most surprising aspect of Europe’s newest treaty is not so much its 
content, but more the way it came into being. For the first time in the his-
tory of European integration, a treaty is not the result of a “night of the long 
knives” at an EU Summit, but rather a several-year process. This process, 
characterized by a series of advances and setbacks, began with the “Laeken 
Declaration”
1, in which the Heads of State and Government of the EU 
Member States recognized that the usual modes of diplomacy no longer 
represented an appropriate means for setting the course of future European 
politics. Consequently in February 2002, a Convention presided by former 
French president Valery Giscard d’Estaing was convened for the purpose 
of working on proposals on institutional and constitutional reforms of the 
European Union. Moreover, the Convention sought to find a “European 
Constitution” that would guarantee democratic principles in the enlarged 
EU while at the same time preserving its effectiveness both domestically 
and externally. In July 2003, a Draft Constitutional Treaty was submitted to 
the European Heads of State and Government
2 and, after approximately 
 
1   European Council, “Presidency Conclusions. European Council of Laeken, Decem-
ber 14-15, 2001, Brussels. 
2   “Draft Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe“, adopted by consensus by the 
European Convention on 13 June and 10 July 2003, submitted to the President of 
the European Council on 18 July 2003 in Rome, Luxembourg 2003. Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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one year of further negotiations, was approved by the European Council. 
However, it did not take long for the ratification process to be derailed by 
the rejections of the Constitutional Treaty in the French and Dutch refer-
enda of 2005. Once again, the quo vadis Europa question pervaded EU po-
litical discourse and the European Council subsequently called for a period 
of reflection. 
Under the German Presidency of 2007, efforts were made to salvage the 
constitutional project by abandoning the “constitution”, “watering down” 
reform issues
3 and establishing a road map for adopting a new reform 
treaty. The Portuguese Presidency overtook this task during the second half 
of 2007, soon presenting a “Draft Treaty amending the Treaty on European 
Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community” – the title’s 
prolixity alone being a stark contrast to the previously ambitious “Constitu-
tion for Europe”. After a series of compromises, the European Council fi-
nally agreed on the reform treaty in October, and the EU Member States 
signed the Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007.
4 While the breakthrough 
triggered both relief and hope that the European impasse would soon be 
over, there is still reason for concern. First, the ratification process awaits 
and, though most Member States will abstain from holding referenda, at 
least one country, Ireland, will be asking its citizens to approve the new 
treaty in June this year. Thus, one cannot be certain that all 27 parliaments 
and at least one electorate will ratify the treaty.
5 Secondly, in the end the 
Member States seem to have returned to the “old way” of treaty reform 
with intergovernmental negotiations among Member-State governments. 
Ironically, they have tried to rescue the ‘constitution’ – which was con-
ceived, among other things, to secure democracy in the EU – but without 
 
3   König, Thomas / Daimer, Stephanie / Finke, Daniel. (2008) ‘The Treaty Reform of 
the EU: Constitutional Agenda-Setting, Intergovernmental Bargains and the Presi-
dency’s Crisis Management of Ratification Failure’, in: Journal of Common Market 
Studies 46(2): 337-63, here pg. 337-41. 
4   European Commission, “Commission welcomes signature of the Treaty of Lisbon 
and calls for its swift ratification”, December 13, 2007, Brussels.  
5   ‘Treaty Weakens Ireland - McDonald’, in: The Irish Times, February 29, 2008. 
Available at: http://www.ireland.com/newspaper/breaking/2008/0229/breaking65. 
htm. Making and Breaking Promises 
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dubbing the treaty so and moreover without consulting the European citi-
zens.
6  
Nonetheless, the Treaty of Lisbon stems by and large from the formally 
proposed Constitutional Treaty. Its drafting did present an innovative 
method of participation and reform in the European integration project. Al-
ready, Member State governments have declared the Treaty a reform that 
will make Europe “more transparent, efficient and democratic”, which is 
what “helps citizens in Europe”.
7 Yet, aside from the uncertainty surround-
ing the new treaty’s ratification, the substance of the reform treaty – like its 
predecessor – equally warrants more sobriety than euphoria. The new 
document offers both improvements and drawbacks. On the positive side, 
the reform treaty, if ratified, would simplify the EU legislative procedures, 
reduce the amount of legal instruments, shift the EU from the three-pillar 
system to a more uniform institutional framework, and endow the EU with 
a single legal personality. However, a major question remains of whether 
procedures within the EU will indeed become more transparent and 
whether the sizeable interest differences among the Member States in an 
enlarged union will prevent that. In the following, we attempt to examine 
what the next treaty really has to offer and to assess to what extent the 
Treaty of Lisbon can fulfil its promise of more transparency, efficiency and 
democracy.  
2. More Transparency? 
2.1. A New “Open Door” Policy of the Council of Ministers 
Comprehending which EU institution is responsible for what has been any-
thing but easy for EU citizens. Most decisions from the European level re-
sult from negotiations between the governments of the Member States and 
 
6   Tsebelis, George. (2008) ‘Thinking about the Recent Past and the Future of the 
EU’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 46(2): 265-92, here pg. 286-89. 
7   Steinmeier, Franz-Walter, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Germany, during the sign-
ing of the Treaty of Lisbon, December 13, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.magazine-deutschland.de/ereignis_meldung.php?id=736. Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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the Commission, consisting frequently of obscure package deals, reciprocal 
arrangements, and side-payments. Moreover, these decisions tend to be met 
in anonymous networks. Consequently, Title II Article 8a-c of the Reform 
Treaty avows that the EU institutions are to work transparently. In this 
spirit, the Council of the European Union for example shall in the future 
hold meetings publicly when debating or voting on legislative acts (Title II, 
Art. 9c (8)).
8 The treaty however divides Council meetings into two types. 
While sessions involving debates and votes on legislative acts will be open 
to the public, sessions that do not pertain to legislation will continue to take 
place behind closed doors. When controversial legislative proposals are at 
hand, one may assume that the package deals and side payments often nec-
essary for overcoming a deadlock in decision making will not be negotiated 
openly and be deferred to the second type of meeting. Horse-trading surely 
tends to place the participants in a negative light, which may represent the 
ulterior motive for keeping certain Council meetings secret. Under these 
conditions, Council members will in all likelihood continue their efforts to 
reach unanimous decisions in practice, even in areas where a qualified ma-
jority is sufficient. In those cases where the Council fails to reach consen-
sus, the public part of the Council sessions could provide an opportunity for 
divergent sides to “showcase” for their respective national publics. Alas, 
costs and benefits of open Council meetings cannot yet be predicted. 
2.2. Who gets what, when and how – the Creation of a Vertical Sys-
tem of Competences 
On the other hand, the creation of a vertical system of competences could 
substantially increase the transparency of European politics. The pressure 
for reform on this issue was particularly high: Regions above all, but also 
municipalities have insisted on stronger recognition of the regional dimen-
sion of Europe and demanded stricter adherence to the principle of subsidi-
arity; the EU has also played a role in strengthening regionalism and 
 
8   All references to articles in the Treaty of Lisbon have been taken from the version 
available on the European Union website: http://europa.eu/. The text can be found 
in various languages through the following link: http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/ 
full_text/index_en.htm. Making and Breaking Promises 
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encouraging “territorial positioning” in sub-national authorities.
9 Along 
these lines, regional units and federal sub-units such as the German Länder 
hoped to win or win back a greater scope of political power.
10 These de-
mands were made in the light of growing concerns that the EU institutions 
would loosely interpret their responsibilities in order to expand their pow-
ers and intensify the Member States’ and their sub-units’ loss of sover-
eignty as a result.  
The Treaty of Lisbon can only partially alleviate these fears. For example, 
the new treaty systematizes competences in the multi-level governance sys-
tem of the EU according to three categories. This may provide enhanced 
clarity (Title I, Art. 2a): exclusive competence of the EU; shared compe-
tences with Member States; and competences to carry out actions to sup-
port, coordinate or supplement the actions of the Member States. A 
delimitation of competences and a list of the areas they apply to would 
surely increase the transparency of the decision-making process. However, 
the reforms are not drastic enough to guarantee that competence conflicts 
between the EU and the Member States are easily interpretable and hence 
resolvable, but rather quite the opposite.  
2.3. Stronger Subsidiarity: Bringing the National Parliaments back 
in… 
Thus, a strengthening of the principle of subsidiarity may pose a more 
promising way to reach an effective delineation of competences. The em-
phasis placed on the principle of subsidiarity in the Lisbon Treaty – as in 
the former draft constitution treaty – expresses not only a rejection of a 
European super-state, but also the commitment to a democratic governance 
order: in essence, the higher level of governance should only be responsible 
for a task when the lower levels are not capable of handling it.
11 The newly 
 
9   Sykes, Oliver / Shaw, David. (2008) ‘Investigating Territorial Positioning by Sub-
state Territories in Europe’, in: Regional and Federal Studies 18(1): 55-76.  
10  Höreth, Marcus. (2003) ‘When Dreams Come True: The Role of Powerful Regions 
in Future Europe’, ZEI Discussion Paper C 121, Bonn. 
11  Vergés Bausili, Anna. (2002) ‘Rethinking the Methods of Dividing and Exercising 
Powers in the EU: Reforming Subsidiarity and National Parliaments’, in: Jean 
Monnet Working Paper 9/02. Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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formulated subsidiarity principle (General Provisions, Art. 3b) differs from 
the hitherto-existing rule by including the regional and local levels of the 
Member States. In the future, a two-step assessment procedure will be nec-
essary in accordance with the strengthened principle of subsidiarity. The 
first step involves ascertaining whether the local, regional or national level 
has the capacity to resolve an imminent problem. If that is not the case, 
measures toward finding a solution may be taken at the EU level. But a 
second step requires the EU level to provide evidence that it can actually 
resolve the problem more effectively. For ensuring the adherence to sub-
sidiarity, national parliaments have been assigned the role of a controlling 
body in this procedure. At first glance, national parliaments might be most 
satisfied with this empowerment, since they have been the biggest losers of 
the transfer of powers to the Union level in the last years
12. 
The “Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Pro-
portionality”
13 of the Lisbon Treaty sets forth how the national parliaments 
are to be included. In addition to the assessments undertaken by the Com-
munity institutions, the treaty provides for an “early warning system”. Prior 
to the submission of a legislative act, the Commission is to “carry out broad 
consultations” (Title II, Art. 8b) with concerned parties. The Commission 
must provide reasons for its draft legislation in a detailed “subsidiarity 
statement” (Subsidiarity Protocol, Art. 5), which shall allow an assessment 
of whether the principle of subsidiarity would be upheld. The ‘burden of 
proof’ lies solely with the Commission and applies only to European legis-
lative proposals where the Commission is the initiator and not to other 
measures taken at EU level. 
Moreover, the political control mechanism obligates the Commission to 
forward its legislative proposal to each Member State national parliament 
at the same time it sends its proposal to the EU legislative institutions, i.e. 
 
12  Mauer, Andreas / Wessels, Wolfgang (Eds.) (2001) National Parliaments on their 
Ways to Europe. Losers or Latecomers, Baden-Baden: Nomos; Raunio, Tapio / Hix, 
Simon. (2001) ‘Backbenchers Learn to Fight Back: European Integration and Par-
liamentary Government’, in: Goetz, Klaus / Hix, Simon (Eds.) Europeanised Poli-
tics? European Integration and National Political Systems, London: Frank Cass 
Publications, pg. 142-68. 
13  Hereinafter referred to as “Subsidiarity Protocol”. Making and Breaking Promises 
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the Council of the EU and the European Parliament. Each parliament has 
the opportunity to submit a statement within eight weeks. If a statement of 
non-compliance with subsidiarity is supported by at least one-third of the 
votes from the national parliaments, then the Commission must review its 
proposal (Subsidiarity Protocol, Art. 7). Following review, the Commission 
can maintain, amend or withdraw its proposal and must justify its decision 
accordingly. And should the Commission decide to keep the proposal, the 
procedure continues, as the Council of the EU and the European Parliament 
are also obliged to further scrutinize the proposal with regard to its confor-
mity with the principle of subsidiarity. If they verify non-compliance, they 
can reject the Commission’s proposal. The Lisbon Treaty also provides for 
the possibility for subsidiarity non-compliance cases to be brought before 
the Court of Justice of the European Union, not only by the Committee of 
the Regions but also by national parliaments – yet the former’s right to sue 
is limited pursuant to Article 230, meaning a suit cannot be brought before 
the Court of Justice by national parliaments directly, but rather by their 
own government on behalf of the parliament and in accordance with their 
respective legal order.  
Through the early warning system, the national parliaments will gain for 
the first time the possibility to directly influence EU legislation. On the one 
hand, this innovation can be viewed – and will most likely be “marketed” 
during the ratification process – as a participatory breakthrough that pro-
vides national parliaments with a voice in European law making. On the 
other hand, the reform seems, from a constitution-legal standpoint, fairly 
problematic: the mechanisms designated in the new treaty essentially create 
a tricameral system, but without establishing a true third chamber. The na-
tional parliaments would be integrated in the EU legislative process, with-
out being an institution of the EU. Consequently, they would bypass the 
very institution established for representing Member State interests, the 
Council of Ministers. If Member States have objections, especially in refer-
ence to the principle of subsidiarity and the protection of Member State 
law-making powers, they can and should be articulated within the Council 
of Ministers. The early warning system via national parliaments could be 
practiced through institutional mechanisms that already exist. There are no, Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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at least institution-structural, hurdles that can stop parliaments from com-
pelling their respective governments to adjust their voting behaviour in the 
Council of Ministers to their preferences. Such “checking and balancing” 
of the parliament vis-à-vis its cabinet would not contradict parliamentary 
democracy; on the contrary, it is absolutely compatible. Moreover, the new 
system poses the question of how the Member State governments should be 
accountable to their parliaments, if the latter themselves are directly in-
volved in the EU legislative process. Not least of concern is an additional 
legitimacy issue: the national parliaments’ future role as “sentinels” itself 
violates the principle of subsidiarity. Instead of contributing to a clearer 
delineation of powers between the various levels of European governance, 
the early warning system blurs the lines of responsibility and competence 
in the EU even further. By awarding the national parliaments with this ad-
ditional power, the treaty in effect intrudes into the individual national con-
stitutional-legal orders.  
3. More Efficiency and Effectiveness? 
3.1. The Commission: Still the “Heart” of the Union 
As concerns the productivity and efficacy of the Commission, the monop-
oly of initiative for legislative acts is of fundamental importance. This 
represents not only a core element of the “Community Method”
14 and a 
means to ensure coherent European legislation, but also the Commission’s 
central instrument of power. It is first and foremost its monopolized right of 
initiative that makes the Commission the “heart of the Union”
15. Particu-
larly for the smaller Member States, a well-functioning Commission bound 
to the interests of the Community as a whole helps to prevent dominance 
by the bigger states in the EU system. For the most part however, the mo-
nopoly of initiative remains limited by Lisbon to the classic Community 
 
14  Scharpf, Fritz. (2001) ‘European Governance: Common Concerns vs. The Chal-
lenge of Diversity’, in: MPIfG Working Paper 01/6.  
15  Nugent, Neill (Ed.) (2002) At the Heart of the Union. Studies of the European 
Commission, 2nd Ed. Basingstoke: Palgrave. Making and Breaking Promises 
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policy areas, until now under the so-called “first pillar” (e.g. internal mar-
ket, agriculture, competition, consumer and environmental protection). The 
new treaty has altered little to Commission’s limited role in Common For-
eign and Security Policy, and where the Treaty enhances the Commission 
in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice, it also provides “emergency 
brakes” for Member States (see Art. 61i and Art. 62)
16. 
A controversial issue among EU members for quite some time has been the 
size of the Commission.
17 In light of the recent enlargements of the EU, 
from 15 to currently 27 members, it no longer seemed possible to have a 
Commission that could work effectively while adhering to the traditional 
practice of allotting at least one commissioner for each Member State. But 
a departure from full national representation, i.e. at least one Commissioner 
per Member State, posed a highly difficult reform step for the EU members 
to take. In contrast to the draft constitutional treaty, the Treaty of Lisbon 
succeeded in reaching an agreement on the reduction of the number of 
Commissioners in the European Commission. As of November 2014, the 
Commission will consist of a number of members corresponding to two-
thirds of the number of Member States, the President of the Commission 
and the “High Representative” included, while Commissioners will be cho-
sen on a basis of “strictly equal rotation” between the Member States (Title 
III, Art. 9d). The selection of Commissioners should furthermore reflect the 
demographic and geographic composition of the EU members. At the same 
time, the Treaty, and in this point akin to the draft constitutional treaty, has 
upgraded the position of the Commission President, but without altering the 
collegial nature of the Commission. Hence, the Commission President, al-
though stronger, is still far from equivalent to a “Head of Government” 
such as prime ministers common at the national level. But in sum, the new 
arrangement of the Commission could create a body that is easier to man-
age and coordinate. 
 
16  See also: Duff, Andrew. ‘True Guide to the Treaty of Lisbon’, Alliance of Liberals 
and Democrats for Europe, Brussels, December 12, 2007. Available at: 
http://www.alde.eu/fileadmin/files/Download/True-Guide-NEW.pdf. 
17   Höreth, Marcus. (2002) ‘Entscheidungsfindung nach Nizza – die Europäische 
Kommission’, in: Zervakis, Peter / Cullen, Peter (Eds.) The Post-Nice Process: To-
wards a European Constitution?, Baden-Baden: Nomos, pg. 85-102. Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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3.2. The European Council President 
In contrast to the generally positive reforms illustrated above, the treaty’s 
creation of a President of the European Council could soon curb the Com-
mission’s enthusiasm. As foreseen in the former draft constitutional treaty, 
the Treaty of Lisbon would establish a President elected by the European 
Council for a two-and-a-half year term, renewable once, replacing – or 
supplementing, to be more precise – the six-month rotating Council Presi-
dency (Title III, Art. 9b). As to transparency and effectiveness after Lisbon, 
the new President could help make European leadership more identifiable, 
while also increasing effectiveness and continuity through a longer-term 
president, who can assist in coordinating and preparing the work and thus 
cohesion of the European Council. The new position also produces a fur-
ther multiplication of executives at the EU level, and thus can hardly be 
seen as a positive development from the Commission’s point of view and 
its position in the EU institutional framework.
18 The balance of power be-
tween the European Commission, the supranational executive of the Union, 
and its most important intergovernmental counterpart, the European Coun-
cil, has provided for institutional and political stability within the Union. 
The power issue likewise represents the nucleus of the ongoing conflict be-
tween Intergovernmentalism and Supranationalism as well as between 
large and small Member States and differing expectations about what 
European integration is and should be.
19 Resolving this issue in favour of 
the Intergovernmentalists – institutionally embodied by the European 
Council, the Heads of State and Government of the EU Member States – 
could potentially place consensus in the integration project at risk. This 
concern becomes all the more salient when considering the Union’s tradi-
tionally delicate balance between further integration, democratic participa-
tion and preservation of Member State interests and influence.
20  
 
18  Blavoukos, Spyros / Bourantonis, Dimitris / Pagoulatos, George. (2007) ‘A Presi-
dent for the European Union: A New Actor in Town?’, in: Journal of Common 
Market Studies 45(2): 231-52. 
19  Rosamond, Ben. (2002) Theories of European Integration, NY: Palgrave, pg. 1-17, 
130-156. 
20  Olsen, Johan P. (2004) ‘Unity, diversity and democratic institutions’, in: ARENA 
Working Papers 04/13. Making and Breaking Promises 
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Then again, the Treaty of Lisbon plainly restricts the power of the President 
of the European Council, who, pursuant to the treaty, will chiefly carry out 
intermediary and steering functions. Moreover, the effect of possible insti-
tutional tensions that the dual executive could trigger should not be overes-
timated. The introduction of the President of the European Council can 
certainly be construed as a strengthening of the intergovernmental dimen-
sion, but also as a “trade-off” for upgrading the Commission President and 
other supranational enhancements
21, and hence congruent with the long-
established treaty-making practice of squaring Member State sovereignty 
with deepened integration. Nor does the dual executive in the Treaty of 
Lisbon pose an anomaly, considering the rationale of the EU system. In 
carrying over the dual-headed nature of the European Union
22, the treaty’s 
institutional arrangement is consistent with the path of European integra-
tion thus far and, in this respect, and expression of constitutional continu-
ity. Nevertheless, the introduction of another executive position at EU level 
– in addition to the Commission President, the rotating Council Presidency 
of the Council of the European Union (Council of Ministers)
23, and the 
quadri-annual European Council meetings – raises the critical question 
once again of whether the Lisbon Treaty’s institutional innovation can im-
prove transparency and the efficiency of leadership in the EU.   
3.3. No Minister! The “High Representative of the Union for Foreign 
Affairs” 
Besides the European Council President, the Treaty of Lisbon introduces an 
additional institutional novelty. In the past few years, the European Union 
has not been able to do justice to its claim to a leading role in international 
 
21  Closa, Carlos. (2004) ‘The Convention Method and the transformation of EU con-
stitutional politics’, in: Eriksen, Erik Oddvar / Fossum, John Erik / Menédez, Au-
gustín José (Eds.) Developing a Constitution for Europe, London: Routledge, pg. 
183-206, here pg. 198-202. 
22  Hix, Simon. (2005) The Political System of the European Union, 2nd Ed., Hound-
mills, Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, here pg. 31-70. 
23  Moreover, the Council Presidency is already a de facto triple presidency shared by 
three successive Member States: the current Member State in cooperation with the 
previous Member State holding the Presidency and the next Member State to hold 
the Presidency.  Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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politics. Although not as symbolically far-reaching as the draft constitu-
tional treaty – which would have introduced a Union “Minister for Foreign 
Affairs” – the Lisbon Treaty establishes a “High Representative of the Un-
ion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”, merging the former High 
Representative created by the Treaty of Amsterdam with the Commissioner 
for External Relations into one position (Title III, Art. 9e and Art. 13a.). As 
an obvious advantage, the reform promises to bring increased visibility to 
the European Union’s external actions, and even bears potential for meet-
ing Henry Kissinger’s notorious demand for someone to call when he 
wanted to “speak to Europe”.
24 Moreover, the Lisbon Treaty maintains the 
draft constitution’s creation of a “European External Action Service” to 
assist the High Representative and cooperate with Member State diplomatic 
services and will be composed of relevant officials from the Council’s 
General Secretariat and the Commission (Title III, Art. 13a (3))  and with 
officials seconded by Member State foreign and diplomatic services. The 
High Representative, who will simultaneously hold the office of Vice-
President of the Commission, is to be appointed by the European Council 
by qualified majority and by approval of the Commission President. With 
the ultimate goal of ensuring coherence of the Union’s external actions and 
its Common Foreign and Security Policy, the High Representative will be 
responsible for implementation of pertinent decisions by the European 
Council and the Council of Ministers. 
That the High Representative will be wearing a “double hat” as a member 
of the Commission and the Council could provoke serious institutional 
problems. Via the High Representative – who will chair the Council of 
Ministers’ Foreign Affairs Council (Art. 13a (1)) and participate in Euro-
pean Council meetings and is thus intergovernmentally bound – it is quite 
imaginable that the Council may attempt to encroach upon Commission 
competences, especially in the area of external trade and development pol-
icy. Conversely, it is just as possible that the Commission will try to influ-
 
24  Lamy, Pascal. (2004) ‘Thoughts on Governance from Europe: Making Sure We 
don’t forget the Cosmopolitics’, in: Ryten, Jacob (Ed.) The Sterling Public Servant. 
A Global Tribute to Sylvia Ostry, Montreal/Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University 
Press, 203-215, here pg. 210. Making and Breaking Promises 
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ence the Council through the High Representative, who will likewise be 
supranationally bound to the Commission and the Commission President’s 
guideline competence (Title II, Art. 9d (6)). In short, with the position of 
the High Representative and how it has been designed, the Treaty of Lisbon 
has virtually programmed “turf wars”
25 between the Commission and the 
Council and it remains to be seen, whether these issues will or even can be 
addressed pre-emptively, i.e., before the Treaty takes effect. On the whole, 
the new EU High Representative epitomizes a typical endeavour in Euro-
pean integration, i.e. the reversion to complex institutional measures in or-
der to avoid addressing the unresolved question of finalité – the question of 
whether the EU should develop toward a federation or a more confederal 
union of nation-states
26. One can postulate three basic scenarios, namely 
that the High Representative will become an “extension” of the Commis-
sion into the Council, or vice-versa, or on the contrary, the High Represen-
tative may be able to prevent the position from being instrumentalised and 
instead play an important role as a mediator between supranational and in-
tergovernmental elements of European governance.  
Either way, the treaty leaves much room for speculation in this area. Where 
the treaty does provide clarity is on Common Foreign and Security Policy 
and its near future. In the “Declarations Concerning Provisions of the Trea-
ties”, both declaration 13 and 14 express unequivocally that, despite the 
increased coherency and cohesion of the Union’s external actions envis-
aged in the treaty, foreign policy, its conduct and formulation will continue 
to rest within the domain of the national governments. In other words, EU 
external actions will by no means precede Member State policy; Lisbon in 
substance cannot alter the Member States’ more uncommon than common 
foreign policy.
27 Given that, one can in turn safely conclude that, regardless 
 
25  Kurpas, Sebastian / Crum, Ben / et. al. (2007) ‘The Treaty of Lisbon: Implementing 
the Institutional Innovations’, Joint Study of  the European Policy Centre, Egmont, 
and the Centre for European Policy Studies, here pg. 138.  
26  Weiler, Joseph H.H. (2002) ‘A Constitution for Europe? Some Hard Choices’, in: 
Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 563-80. 
27  The strictly intergovernmental nature of foreign policy is also underlined in the 
Treaty by Articles 9f and 11(1) for example, which state that foreign and security Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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of how the position develops, the scope of the High Representative’s au-
thority is strictly limited from the outset. 
3.4. Council Decision-Making: Between More Efficiency and Strong 
Veto-Powers   
Decision-making procedures and above all voting weights in the Council of 
Ministers can be added to the list of chronic “apples of discord” in EU 
treaty negotiations. Precisely this issue had originally played a significant 
part in delaying the Intergovernmental Conference’s adoption of the draft 
constitutional treaty by nearly a year. Indeed, the issue continuously evokes 
a great deal of contention, though this is hardly surprising as it encom-
passes several other traditional tensions in the EU, such as between large 
and small states and the dual character of a Union of States versus a Union 
of Citizens in Europe. Consequently, it is just as unsurprising that the 
Treaty of Lisbon’s provisions on voting in the Council make up a complex 
set of rules, having reached a delicate balance between proportional and 
equal representation of the Member States in the Council. The Treaty of 
Lisbon adopts a “double majority” for areas where the Council decides by 
qualified majority – an efficient departure from the triple majority required 
under the Treaty of Nice – and is defined as 55 % of the Council mem-
bers
28 and representing 65 % of the entire population of the Union (Title 
III, Art. 9c), rendering the long-established system of voting weights obso-
lete. What should not be overlooked is the Treaty’s success in extending 
majority voting to more than thirty new areas.
29 At the same time, the treaty 
lays down a series of restrictions that may encumber Council decision pro-
cedures and leave room for a variety of exceptions.  
 
policy are excluded from the jurisdiction of the Court of Justice of the European 
Union – and hence the supranational level – as well. 
28  At present, this equates to a minimum of 15 of the 27 EU members. 
29  Robert Schuman Foundation. (2008) ‘Annex 3: List of the articles coming under 
qualified majority voting’, in: Understanding the Lisbon Treaty. Available at: 
http://www.robert-schuman.org/tout-comprendre-sur-le-traite-de-lisbonne.php. Making and Breaking Promises 
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In “sensitive” policy areas such as taxation, social security, and Common 
and Foreign Security Policy (see Art. 10 and 11), the unanimity rule still 
applies.  
The double majority of 55 and 65 percent does not even apply to all cases 
in which the Council votes by qualified majority. Article 205 sets forth that 
qualified majority is defined as 72 % of the Council members, and repre-
senting 65 % of the population of the Union when the Council is not acting 
“on a proposal from the Commission or from the High Representative of 
the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. Such would be the case 
when, for example, the Council acts upon its own initiative on certain is-
sues in the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice. 
The Treaty of Lisbon maintains the mechanism of the blocking minority, 
which must consist of at least four Council members and representing more 
than 35 % of the participating Member States (Art. 9c (4) and Art. 205). 
This rule corresponds with the imperative of EU integration to balance the 
interests of small and large Member States and serves to prevent three large 
states (e.g. France, Germany and U.K.), which alone fulfil the 35 % of the 
population requirement, from being able to form a blocking minority, and 
thus easily hinder issues of interest to smaller and medium sized states.  
The controversial Ioannina Compromise,
30 reached informally in 1994 and 
abandoned under the Treaty of Nice, has been re-adopted and adapted for 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Under the attached “Declarations Concerning Provi-
sions of the Treaty”, the Declaration on Article 9 C(4) and Article 205(2) 
lays down the terms for the Ioannina Compromise in the transitional period 
from 2014, when the new rules on qualified majority voting (cf. Art. 9 c 
(4)) in the Council take effect, to 2017. According to this provision, the 
Council must delay voting if members of the Council representing 75 % of 
the population or 75 % of the number of Member States required for a 
blocking minority – i.e. 26.25 % of the Union’s population or 26.25 % of 
the Council members – indicate opposition to voting by qualified majority. 
 
30  Hosli, Madaleine. (1999) ‘Power, Connected Coalitions, and Efficiency: Challenges 
to the Council of the European Union’, in: International Political Science Review 
20(4): 371-91.  Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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In such instances, the Council must do “all in its power” and “within a rea-
sonable time” to reach a more satisfactory solution and address the con-
cerns raised by the Council members (Section 1, Art. 1-3 of the Declaration 
on Article 9 C(4) and Article 205(2)). As of 2017, the threshold drops to at 
least 55% of the Council members or representing at least 55% of the Un-
ion’s population – i.e. 19.25 % of the Union population or 19.25 % of the 
Council members – for the deferral process to be invoked (Section 2, Art. 
4-6 of the Declaration on Art. 9 C(4) and Art. 205(2)). As of 2017, it will 
only take 5 Member States out of 27 to obstruct the legislative process. 
During the transitional period from 2014 to 2017, Article 3 of the “Provi-
sions concerning the Qualified Majority” (Title II of the Protocol on Tran-
sitional Provisions) allows any Council member to request that a measure – 
to be adopted by the new qualified majority – be adopted in accordance 
with the qualified majority as defined in paragraph 3 of that article; hence, 
any Council member may request that voting on a legislative act that is par-
ticularly sensitive to that Member State revert to the modalities of qualified 
majority under the Treaty of Nice with weighted voting. A member of the 
European Council or the Council of Ministers may also request that a check 
be made on whether an act adopted by the European Council or the Council 
by qualified majority represents 62 % of the total population of the Union 
(paragraph 4 of Art. 3 of the “Provisions concerning the Qualified Major-
ity”).  
On the whole, the Treaty of Lisbon achieves a number of improvements for 
voting procedures in the Council, albeit with mixed results. From the per-
spective of efficient decision-making as well as more proportionality in 
representation, the introduction of the double majority offers a highly sig-
nificant improvement
31 compared with decision procedures until now and 
reduces the degree of over- and under-representation of Member States. In 
light of the restrictions illustrated above, the designers of the Reform 
Treaty have nonetheless managed to build in a number of “imponderabili-
ties”. Regarding the Ioannina Compromise, the overall potential for block-
 
31  Laruelle, Annick / Valenciano, Federico. (2002) ‘Inequality among EU citizens in 
the EU’s Council decision procedure’, in: European Journal of Political Economy 
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age in the Council on legislative matters is difficult to predict, not least be-
cause the Treaty fails to explicitly define, for example, “a reasonable time”. 
Although the Polish delegation argued that this could be up to two years, 
the consensus reached among the Member States governments appears to 
be a maximum period of three months.
32 Once again, it can be reasonably 
expected that sooner or later the European Court of Justice will have to step 
in to resolve these open questions.  
In general, the Treaty hardly makes it easy to comprehend which voting 
rules apply when. At the same time, the numerous attached Protocols and 
Declarations reveal that the steps taken forward in the Treaty, while osten-
sibly bold, are in effect largely reluctant. At first glance, it would likewise 
seem peculiar that the threshold for deferring voting by qualified majority 
actually decreases, from three-fourths of the blocking minority to 55 % af-
ter the transitional period, i.e. after 2017, and not the opposite (cf. (4) 
above). Reading between the lines however, the motivation becomes clear, 
given that the provision allowing a reversion to the “Nice” rules on quali-
fied majority voting – illustrated in (5) above – expires in 2017. The trade-
off thus for Member States was to lower the percentage necessary for de-
ferring the voting procedure in the Council, in order to basically maintain 
the potential for pressure individual Member States can exert in the EU leg-
islative process. As it stands, the Treaty allows for considerable debate on 
the extent to which the new rules will affect voting in the Council. How-
ever, one can assume that decision making in the Council will not change 
significantly once the treaty takes effect, but rather after the transitional 
period at the earliest, if at all. 
4. More Democracy? 
4.1. Still in Search of a Right Model of Democracy 
The process of European integration towards an ever closer union has led 
the EU into an increasingly complex dilemma. Parallel to the expansion of 
 
32  Kurpas, Sebastian. (2007) ‘The Treaty of Lisbon – How much “Constitution” is 
Left?’, in: CEPS Policy Brief No. 147, here pg. 6. Marcus Höreth/Jared Sonnicksen 
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its competences, – a continuous trend in the EC/EU since the European 
Single Act – the critical debate of the European Union and in particular its 
legitimacy and democracy deficit have intensified commensurately.
33 Es-
sentially, the growing authority, scope of activity and overall importance of 
the European Union have made the question of to whom EU actors can be 
held accountable all the more urgent,
34 particularly since democratisation 
has not been able to keep up pace with the expansion of EU authority. As 
the Laeken Declaration of 2001 demonstrates, the goal of a more democ-
ratic union closer to its citizens represented one of, if not the most impor-
tant starting points for initiating the Constitution debate. Accordingly, and 
similar to the draft constitutional treaty, the Lisbon Treaty makes clear ref-
erence to democracy as one of the fundamental principles upon which the 
Union is founded (General Provisions, Art. 1a). In Title II, Provisions on 
Democratic Principles, Article 8 declares that the functioning of the Union 
is grounded in representative democracy. In addition to the ‘internal’ com-
mitment to democracy, Article 10 A sets the advancement of democracy 
and the rule of law as guiding principles in the external actions of the Un-
ion. But upon closer inspection, the provisions on EU democracy reflect a 
certain indecisiveness with regard to which model of democracy the Union 
shall embrace.  
The Treaty of Lisbon has not settled the conflict between supporters of 
more traditional forms of parliamentary and representative democracy and 
those who favour post-parliamentary, civil-society driven participatory de-
mocracy. Instead, the treaty may invigorate the debate by pledging the EU 
to both models, though only partially. While this can be criticised, the con-
trary viewpoint seems just as, if not more convincing, i.e. that a “hotch-
potch” of democratic models is necessary for the hybrid, sui generis polity 
 
33   Dehousse, Renaud. (1995) ‘Constitutional Reform in the European Community: 
Are there Alternatives to the Majoritarian Avenue?’, in: West European Politics 
18(3): 118-36; Føllesdal, Andreas / Koslowski, Peter (Eds). (1998) Democracy and 
the European Union, Heidelberg: Springer. 
34  Olsen, Johan. (2002) ‘Reforming European Institutions of Governance’, in: Journal 
of Common Studies 40(4): 581-602. Making and Breaking Promises 
  21
of the EU.
35 In Article 8b (2), the Treaty obliges the EU for instance to 
maintain open dialogue with representative associations and “civil society”, 
while Article 8a (2) emphasises representation of EU citizens through the 
European Parliament and 8a (4) refers to the contribution political parties 
make in expressing the citizens’ will. Article 8b (4) introduces yet another 
form of democracy for the first time to European governance, namely di-
rect democracy, by allowing citizens a quasi-right of initiative. Pursuant to 
that, a minimum of one million citizens can “invite”, with unbinding effect, 
the Commission to submit a proposal for a legislative act. Interestingly, the 
Treaty additionally places the enhanced role of national parliaments (Art. 
8c) under the “Provisions on Democratic Principles”, implicitly equating 
the principle of subsidiarity – and the national parliaments’ oversight of its 
application – with a democratic good in and of itself. Though there may be 
grounds for such rationale, for example when viewing “checks and bal-
ances” and vertical separation of powers as an element of democracy, the 
question arises as to the legitimacy of national parliaments – who receive 
no such mandate from EU citizens – to take on this role and thus as to how 
this provision serves EU democracy.  
4.2. The Hybrid Nature of the Commission: Between Independence 
and Accountability 
Looking at the European Commission, the democratic amalgamation up-
held and boosted by the new treaty becomes even more apparent. The 
Commission demonstrates this indecisiveness, as the Treaty of Lisbon at-
tempts to balance between the demands for linking the Commission unam-
biguously to parliamentary-democratic control, e.g. through European 
Parliament election of the Commission, and the pressure for preserving the 
rather technocratic, and thus independent role of this institution.
36 Article 
9a for instance ascribes to the European Parliament the function to “elect 
 
35  Wallace, Helen. (2003) ‘Contrasting Images of European Governance’, in: Kohler-
Koch, Beate (Ed.) Linking EU and National Governance. Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, pg. 1-9. 
36  Moravcsik, Andrew. (2002) ‘In Defence of the ‘Democratic Deficit’: Reassessing 
Legitimacy in the European Union’, in: Journal of Common Market Studies 40(4): 
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the President of the Commission”. Article 9d (7) obliges the European 
Council, when nominating a candidate for President of the Commission, to 
“take into account” the results from the elections to the European Parlia-
ment, while the Commission President and the Commission as an entire 
body will remain subject to a vote of consent by the European Parliament, 
and the EP maintains its power to “censure” (Art. 9d (8)) the Commission, 
who shall also be “responsible” to the EP. These institutional features could 
suggest that the Treaty of Lisbon adopts – or at least approaches – the 
model of parliamentary governance for the EU institutions with a cabinet 
government responsible to the majority in parliament, a trend previously 
latent in the European Union
37 and strengthened by Lisbon. But “censure” 
and the modus for applying censure in the EU should be interpreted with 
caution. Equating censure with a “motion of no confidence” is mislead-
ing
38, especially since a majority of two-thirds is required for the European 
Parliament to force the entire Commission to resign. This constitutes a fun-
damental departure from the functional logic of parliamentary systems, re-
sembling more the voting requirements of impeachment in presidential 
systems.
39 Moreover, the oft hoped party-politicization of the Commission 
into an elected EU “government” responsible to a majority in the EP could 
even endanger, not strengthen, the institutional role of the Commission as a 
“supranational” actor advocating Community interests.
40  
Precisely the latter role of the Commission has also been reconfirmed by 
the Treaty of Lisbon. Article 9d (1) clearly defines the responsibility of the 
Commission to promote “the general interest of the Union”. In contrast, 
even contradiction to the provisions on taking into account the results of 
the EP elections, Article 9d (3) sets forth that Commission members are to 
 
37  Magnette, Paul. (2001) ‘Appointing and Censuring the European Commission: The 
Adaptation of Parliamentary Institutions to the Community Context’, in: European 
Law Journal 7(3): 292-310.  
38  As the German text of the Treaty, (Misstrauensantrag) does, and has done in previ-
ous treaty texts.  
39  Decker, Frank. (2002) ‘Governance beyond the nation-state. Reflections on the de-
mocratic deficit of the European Union’, in: Journal of European Public Policy 9(2): 
256-72. 
40  Majone, Giandomenico. (2002) ‘The European Commission: The Limits of Cen-
tralization and the Perils of Parliamentarization’, in: Governance 15(3): 375-92. Making and Breaking Promises 
  23
be chosen based on their competence and commitment to Europe and from 
persons “whose independence is beyond doubt”; one can hardly interpret 
from this rule that the selection of a nominee for the Commission should be 
based on his or her political party membership. In yet starker contrast to 
Article 9d (8) – according to which the Commission is responsible to the 
EP – paragraph 3 goes on to underline that the Commission shall be “com-
pletely independent” in carrying out its responsibilities, nor shall it take in-
structions from “any Government or other institution, body, office or 
entity”. The contrasting Commission roles, between technocratic, output-
oriented administrating “vanguard of the Treaties”
41 and incipient parlia-
mentary governing Cabinet, have, when taken together, been remarkably 
ambiguous – and this situation represents an ambiguity that the Treaty of 
Lisbon will make nearly superlative.  
4.3. And the Winner is: The European Parliament? 
For the European Parliament, the Treaty of Lisbon may be bring more 
promising changes and could make the solely directly-elected EU institu-
tion the “winner of the treaty”
42 once again. In general, the new treaty, in 
this respect parallel to the draft constitutional treaty, advances co-decision 
to the “ordinary” legislative procedure in European governance (see Art. 
251). As a result, the areas where the European Parliament has legislative 
power on par with the Council – when the Council adopts acts by qualified 
majority – will increase significantly. At a nearly “equal footing” with the 
Council,
43 the European Parliament will be able to vote on more questions 
 
41   Börzel, Tanja. (2003) ‘Guarding the Treaty: The Compliance Strategies of the 
European Commission’, in: ibid./Cichowski, Rachel. (Eds.) The State of the Euro-
pean Union. Law Politics and Society, (Vol. 6) Oxford: Oxford University Press  
pg. 197-220.  
42  Pollack, Mark. (2000) ‘A Blairite Treaty: Neo-Liberalism and Regulated Capitalism 
in the Treaty of Amsterdam’, in: Neunreither, Karlheinz (Ed.) European Integration 
After Amsterdam. Institutional Dynamics and Prospects for Democracy, Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, pg. 266-289, here pg. 281.  
43  See e.g. European Parliament, Committee on Constitutional Affairs. “Reasons to 
Ratify the Lisbon Treaty this Year”, January 23, 2008. Available at: 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress_page/002-19268-023-01-04-
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on justice and home affairs in the area of Freedom, Security and Justice 
(e.g. Art. 63c, Art. 69b and f), and enjoy higher budgetary control (Art. 
279b), even regarding agricultural policy (Art. 37c, under Title II), from 
which the EP has long been excluded. Given its democratic legitimatory 
singularity among EU institutions on account of its election directly by EU 
citizens, the strengthening of the EP’s position as a legislative body can, 
and surely will be, viewed as one of the most significant achievements of 
the Lisbon Treaty as far as enhancing democracy in the Union is con-
cerned. 
In contrast to most legislatures, however, the European Parliament does not 
have the right of legislative initiative, a situation left unchanged under the 
new treaty. In other words, the right of initiative for legislative proposals 
will rest with the Commission (Art. 9d). In relation to the Commission 
though, the treaty does expand the EP’s competence of control in the inves-
titure procedure. And yet dubbing the parliament’s function here an “elec-
tion”, as the treaty does, is euphemistic at best. The European Council 
proposes a candidate to the EP, who then has the power to confirm or re-
ject; but the selection itself remains within the domain of the Member State 
governments, who through the Council and in cooperation with the EP-
approved Commission President subsequently nominate the other Commis-
sioners. Regardless of the extent to which the European Council will take 
“into account” future EP election results for the Commission investiture, 
the Treaty of Lisbon does not “parliamentarize” the EU institutions of gov-
ernance and instead, similar to the continued ambiguity of the Commis-
sion’s role, reaches a difficult balance between more democratic input and 
Member State control. 
The lack of full parliamentarization does not necessarily mean the Treaty 
forfeits its goal of improving democracy in the Union. While the EP is di-
rectly elected – and thus, on the surface, a logical target to have the non-
elected EU institutions anchored to – one may doubt the comparability of 
the democratic legitimization derived from EP elections with the legitimacy Making and Breaking Promises 
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of national Member State parliaments.
44 A primary source of criticism on 
European elections derives from the lack of a uniform European electoral 
law and moreover, a lack of “European” campaigns. Due to EP elections 
being conducted separately by national party organizations and under na-
tional election rules, the EP elections have become notorious for their “sec-
ond order”
45 status with campaigns held more on national issues and with 
competition between the national parties, not on EU policy. At the same 
time European elections are used as a forum of protest by citizens against 
their own national governments
46, an unsurprising result given the way the 
EP elections are conducted. Under these conditions, the democratic, Euro-
pean-political mandate gained from an EP election is severely limited – not 
least because the principle of equality is not fulfilled given the EP’s com-
position based on degressive proportionality (upheld in the Lisbon Treaty, 
Art. 9a (2)). Thus, although the EP will be stronger than ever, the EU will 
not become a parliamentary democracy any time soon, and for good reason 
when considering the EP’s problematic democratic-legitimatization.   
5. Conclusion 
“With a view to enhancing the efficiency and democratic legitimacy of the Un-
ion…” (Preamble, Treaty of Lisbon) 
Even assuming that the Treaty of Lisbon will be ratified, the constitutional 
debate in Europe will undoubtedly continue in the future. As our analysis 
of the Reform Treaty indicates, there are a number of reasons for this. The 
drafters of the Treaty faced a great deal of ‘tricky’ questions and have re-
sponded with a number of complex answers. Unfortunately, the answers 
 
44  Scully, Roger. (1999) ‘Between Nation, Party and Identity: A Study of European 
Parliamentarians’, in: European Parliament Working Group (EPRG), Working Pa-
per 5. 
45  The phrase was coined as early as 1980. See: Reif, Karlheinz/Schmitt, Hermann. 
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fail to provide convincing solutions for the long-term, especially since re-
garding the promises of more transparency, efficiency and democracy, the 
Treaty leaves much to be desired and fulfilled.  
As far as transparency is concerned, the Treaty strives to create more visi-
bility of key European political actors and enhance the coherency of the 
Union’s actions, both internally and externally. But, what has long counted 
as the major source of the transparency deficit is the EU’s multiplicity of 
legislative procedures differentiated by policy area. In this context, the leg-
islative and decision-making processes, as designed by Lisbon, have been 
simplified on the surface. But the series of opt-outs, blocking minorities, 
emergency breaks, exceptions to the new and improved rules on qualified 
majority, and transitional provisions make it safe to assume that EU citi-
zens – and specialists – will face even larger difficulties in trying to com-
prehend which voting rules apply, when and why.  
On the other hand, it is safe to say that the Treaty of Lisbon has the poten-
tial to make the EU more efficient and effective. On the positive side, the 
EU gains a European Council President and a single High Representative 
for Foreign Affairs as well as a smaller-sized and therefore manageable 
Commission. These reforms should improve the performance and coordina-
tion of the Union’s internal and external actions. And yet, the attempt to 
enhance visibility of European leadership by introducing the permanent 
Council President may have overshot the mark. The European Union does 
not suffer from a lack of a president, but has on the contrary too many 
presidents already and the Reform Treaty diffuses the Union’s executive 
branch even further. Given the new President’s duties, the Treaty offers a 
good recipe for institutional and authority conflicts between European 
leaders.  
Unsurprisingly, one of the most critical products of the new treaty derives 
from Member State bargaining on Council voting procedures. The Ioannina 
Compromise, essentially a ‘dead horse’ in the EU under the Nice Treaty, 
will be resurrected, reducing the threshold for Member States to throttle the 
Council decision-making process that the new Treaty aspired to accelerate. 
On the whole, the negative implications of Ioannina could bear costs affect-Making and Breaking Promises 
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ing all three dimensions of Lisbon’s grand promises – transparency, effi-
ciency and democracy. In a similar fashion, the Treaty also allows Member 
States to invoke “Nice” voting rules, diminishing the transparency and effi-
ciency of Council decisions further. What is more, the institutional ar-
rangements such as the enhanced role of national parliaments, the 
numerous exceptions to the Council voting rules, or the multiplication of 
European executives without sufficient democratic anchorage, could in ef-
fect render it more difficult to localize responsibility for actions and non-
actions at the EU level.   
Viewing the European Union as a house in the making, the Treaty of Lis-
bon presents a new blue print that has not corrected all construction defects, 
and the final result shows that none of the “architects” expected that it 
could. The former patchwork of three pillars with varying procedures and 
rules has been renovated toward a more uniform construct, making the fa-
çade more attractive. However, when looking past the exterior, it becomes 
more and more obvious that the Treaty drafters have brought a number of 
deficiencies in through the back door, yet again. With a view to the politi-
cal circumstances and the malaise following the Constitutional Treaty’s 
rejection, one can conclude that the new treaty has achieved far more than 
expected, but – with a view to ensuring more democracy, transparency and 
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